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THE ROLE AND FUTURE OF CUSTOMARY TORT LAW IN GHANA:
A CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE
Julie A. Davies* & Dominic N. Dagbanja**
I. INTRODUCTION
Customary law, a set of established norms, practices, and usages derived
from the lives of people,1 has thrived in Africa, and in Ghana in particular, for as
long as anyone can remember. For many Ghanaians, the rules governing topics
such as family law and social relations, succession, and certain dignitary torts are
as necessary as air yet just as imperceptible. Indeed, customary law is embedded
in and inseparable from the fundamental ethos and values of Ghanaian and other
African societies. The source of its legal validity is the cultural expression of the
particular society where it is practiced. Although under colonial rule customary
law was sometimes questioned or even rejected by colonial courts, in modern
Ghana it is recognized as part of the laws of the country in the Constitution of the
Republic of Ghana (“1992 Constitution”).2 Yet Ghana, like many other countries

*
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careful research of Daniel Vandekoolwyk, Class of 2010. Professor Kojo Yelpaala
suggested that this topic merited study, and a small chapter on it is included in JULIE A.
DAVIES & PAUL T. HAYDEN, GLOBAL ISSUES IN TORT LAW (2008). We benefitted from the
comments and suggestions of Professor Kojo Yelpaala of Pacific-McGeorge and Professor
Fatou Kiné Camara, of Université Cheikh Anta Diop de Dakar, Senegal. We are also
grateful to the staff of the Library of Congress (at Jefferson and Madison) for their support
in the identification of the relevant sources of literature.
** Barrister-at-Law, Ghana School of Law; LL.M. 2008, University of the Pacific,
McGeorge School of Law; LL.M. 2009 Candidate, The George Washington University
Law School.
1. There are many efforts to define custom and customary law. According to one
source, “[c]ustom in general is essentially the perception of a way to behave and, as a
source of law, a common perception of how to behave in accordance with the other
members of society . . . . Custom is not word or writing; it is gesture.” Jacques
Vanderlinden, What Kind of Law Making in a Global World? The Case of Africa, 67 LA.
L. REV. 1043, 1065 (2007). As a customary law expert, A. N. Allott explained that not all
custom becomes customary law. Custom is part of the “raw material out of which a
customary norm is manufactured.” A. N. ALLOTT, JUDICIAL AND LEGAL SYSTEMS IN AFRICA
5 (1962). Some authors prefer different terminology. One author prefers the term
“chthonic law.” See H. PATRICK GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD 74–75 (3d ed.
2007). Because the Constitution of the Republic of Ghana refers to customary law, that is
the terminology employed here.
2. See GHANA CONST. art. 11(2)–(3).
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in Africa, has experienced enormous changes due to globalization3 and
urbanization. It has absorbed the common law of England, its former colonizer.
Its tort law reflects modern legal issues, such as vehicular negligence, that are
resolved on the basis of British common law rules as accepted and adapted by
Ghanaian courts. However, Ghanaian tort law must also grapple with the
inadequacy of the inherited British law to recognize and provide remedies for
indigenously- and culturally-defined injuries. A significant number of tort cases
raise issues that implicate customary law, and the choice of that law4 by litigants
makes a profound statement about the values of Ghanaian society and the role of
law in preserving them. This article considers both the role customary law has
played in the past and whether customary tort law will play a significant role in
the future. Will it become a relic studied in legal history or anthropology classes,
or will it continue to serve its unique role within Ghanaian society? We believe
its future is dependent on the desire of the Ghanaians to invoke its protections and
embrace its values and on the ability of Ghanaian judges to rethink its meaning in
a changing society.
For one of us, a native of Northern Ghana, this question about the future
of Ghanaian customary tort law is far from academic. It is a problem with which
Ghanaian judges and jurists have been grappling for some time, and as the pace of
development accelerates, the problem takes on greater meaning. A period of
study in the United States (U.S.) has served to focus attention on the role that
customary tort law, as an expression of culture, plays in Ghanaian society and has
provided the occasion to ponder its meaning from afar. For the other of us, a
native of the U.S. who has yet to visit Ghana, the role and future of customary tort
law is an academic question, but a useful one. It provides a unique lens through
which we can re-examine well-accepted principles of U.S. common law torts,
such as slander, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and even the rules of
parental responsibility. Though we bring different interests and perspectives to
the issue, we are of the same mind in recognizing the continuing utility of
Ghanaian customary tort law in the lives of many Ghanaians and in perceiving the
values it reflects as worthy of consideration.
To appreciate and understand customary tort law in Ghana, we focus first
on the role of customary law generally and its place in the Ghanaian legal and
societal structure. It is then possible to consider the subset of Ghanaian customary
law dealing with what we recognize as tort principles. Drawing on the work of
noted Ghanaian judges, jurists, and scholars, we place customary tort law in the

3. See Vanderlinden, supra note 1, at 1047 (stating that for more than a century
Africans individually and collectively have borne the brunt of the impact of globalization,
being subjected to the unilateral choices of European, and later, North American nations).
4. Ghanaian decisions address choice of law issues that arise between the customary
and the common law in some detail. Generally, when the parties are Ghanaians, they may
choose to have the dispute resolved under customary law. See Nkrumah v. Manu, [1971] 1
G.L.R. 176 (Ghana) (discussing choice of law issue).
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context of similar tort law in the civil law tradition and also compare it to
corresponding common law principles. Finally, we consider the possible role of
customary tort law in the future. There are many factors that we believe will
influence whether customary tort law flourishes or expires. Some factors relate to
broad societal forces and trends, such as the impact of religion, the availability of
education, or migration of people from their traditional homelands. The other part
of the equation is people, including the chiefs who know, interpret, and apply
customary law daily, and judges, who have occasion to view customary tort law as
part of their case load and to consider where it fits in a modern society.
Ultimately, though, the future of customary tort law rests on whether it continues
to be accepted and practiced by the people of Ghana.
II. THE CONTENT, SCOPE, AND ROLE OF GHANAIAN CUSTOMARY
TORT LAW
We begin this section by recounting the role of customary law in the
lives of Ghanaians prior to and during colonization, and in the years since
independence. The legal status of customary law during these periods is of
particular importance to gain an understanding of the role of customary law in
modern Ghanaian society. With that foundation, we progress to a full description
of Ghanaian customary tort law. To fully appreciate the similarities and
differences between Ghanaian customary tort law and the approaches taken in
other legal systems, we compare it with the principles that other systems use to
address similar types of problems.
A. History and Evolution of Ghanaian Customary Law
Long before the formation of the modern country now known as Ghana,
and long before the colonization of those lands by the British, there were welldeveloped tribal or ethnic groups in the West African territories for whom custom
was law.5 Linguistically and ethnically diverse, these populations lived by a set of
rules particular and peculiar to their society and community, and the rules of any
other tribe were foreign law.6 When the British began to install a central
government, the concept of customary law, as distinguished from their own
common law system, appeared for the first time.7 During this colonial period of
approximately 140 years, the British recognized the force of African customary
law, establishing a dual court system with some courts administering “general
5. See N. A. Ollennu, The Changing Law and Law Reform in Ghana, 15 J. AFRICAN
L. 132, 133 (1971).
6. See id.
7. See id.
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law,” or the law they brought with them, and native and local courts administering
primarily customary law.8 The Supreme Court of Ghana was empowered to
enforce the customary law in cases where the parties were Africans if the law was
“not . . . repugnant to natural justice, equity and good conscience,”9 or to any other
enactment.10 In addition to this legal authority to veto particular aspects of
customary law that they found repugnant, the British imposed various conditions
on the applicability of customary law. For example, although the courts were to
give effect to native customs, they could only do so when the customs existed at
the date of the passage of the Supreme Court Ordinance in 1876.11 Rules of
customary law were treated as questions of fact, subject to re-litigation in each
case; this ensured that any customary rule or practice could repeatedly be
subjected to the repugnancy test.12 As Vanderlinden describes it, “[i]n order to
become ‘civilized,’ Africans and their laws had to give up all mechanisms linked
to the prevalence of social harmony for the benefit of the adjudicatory legal
process favored in Europe.”13
In 1957, Ghana gained independence from the British colonial
administration. In 1960, the newly formed country of Ghana designated issues of
customary law as questions of law for the court, not questions of fact,14 and
enacted a constitution that promptly eliminated the “repugnancy clause.” Casting
off the British attempt to solidify customary law, the Courts Act provided that if a
court had any doubt as to the existence or content of customary law in any
proceedings, the judge could, after reviewing cases, textbooks, and other sources,
adjourn the proceedings to consult with persons possessing knowledge of the
customary law.15 In these ways, the Republic of Ghana sought to reclaim and
preserve its customary law.
However, by the time of independence, Ghana, like other Anglophonic
African countries, had absorbed or “received” English law. Statutes had been
enacted locally to apply to Ghana, and many “received” English statutes were in
force as well. In addition, there was “received” English common law,
supplemented by local judicial precedent.16 All post-independence constitutions
have continued this dual legal system consisting of enacted statutes and
regulations, common law decisions of the Ghanaian courts, and customary law.
8. See ALLOTT, supra note 1, at 20.
9. See Supreme Court Ordinance, 1876, § 19 (Ghana).
10. See id.
11. See W. C. Ekow-Daniels, Development of Customary Law, 18 REV. GHANA L. 68
(1991–1992).
12. See id.
13. Vanderlinden, supra note 1, at 1048.
14. See Ekow-Daniels, supra note 11; see generally Courts Act, 1993, § 55(1)
(Ghana).
15. See Courts Act § 55(2).
16. See C. Ogwurike, The Source and Authority of African Customary Law, 3 U.
GHANA L.J. 11 (1966).
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The 1992 Constitution, Ghana’s most recent, states that the laws of Ghana
comprise various sources, including the current constitution itself, statutes enacted
by Parliament, and the common law.17 The rules of customary law, defined as
“the rules of law which by custom are applicable to particular communities in
Ghana,” are part of the common law of Ghana.18
The scope and content of customary law in Ghana is very broad. S.Y.
Bimpong-Buta called customary law “the living embodiment of the country’s
cultural heritage.”19 The late Chief Justice, George Kingsley Acquah, described it
well, stating:
Ghana, like most nations, is made up of a number of ethnic
communities, each with its own deep-rooted customary practices
and offences handed down from generation to generation. . . .
Some of the customary practices and offences are related to the
history of the founding fathers of the community, others to
particular incidents in the lifetime of the people, others to
marriage and puberty rites of the women, and others to the day
to day life in the community.20
Customary law possesses a number of characteristic traits including
flexibility, popularity, adaptability, and a communal focus. Because customary
law reflects the practices of the people, it has the capacity to change, and thus to
avoid the fossilization that characterizes some civil codes.21 The fact that
customary law is unwritten enhances its adaptability. Its popularity is vital to its
survival; when a group stops following a practice, it loses force.22
Despite social, economic, political, and external influences and
pressures, the essential features of customary law remain intact because the law
has been instrumental in maintaining the social equilibrium among groups related
by kinship.23 Unlike the U.S. or Europe, where criminal law occupies a large role
in maintaining social order,24 customary law serves much of that function in
17. See GHANA CONST. art. 11(1).
18. See id. art. (11)(3). Article 26(1) entitles every person “to enjoy, practise,
profess, maintain and promote any culture, language, tradition, or religion subject to the
provisions of th[e] Constitution.” Id. art. 26(1).
19. See Seth Yeboa Bimpong-Buta, Sources of Law in Ghana, 15 REV. GHANA L.
129, 129 (1983–1986). The matters covered by these customary practices include the
acquisition of rights in land and matters involving family relationships, such as husbands
and wives, parents and children, marriage and divorce, and chieftaincy. See id.
20. G. K. Acquah, Customary Offences and the Courts, 18 REV. GHANA L. 36, 36
(1991–1992).
21. See Ekow-Daniels, supra note 11.
22. See id.
23. See id.
24. See Vanderlinden, supra note 1, at 1048.
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countries where it is used.25 This use of customary law underscores the dual and
plural nature of African law. At the traditional level, society does not prosecute or
punish an offender, but the initiation of a complaint brings to the forefront not
only the individual’s interest, but also the collective interest in addressing conduct
that may disrupt the “necessary harmony that society needs to survive.”26
Remedies may range from apologies to compensation.27 This communal focus is
evident in the Ghanaian customary tort law.
Although Ghanaians rejected the assertion that colonial courts should tell
them when customary law was “repugnant to natural justice, equity and good
conscience,” they recognized that there might be a need to prune their own
customary law rules if they were outmoded or against public policy. This is done
in several ways. The 1992 Constitution states that “[a]ll customary practices
which dehumanise or are injurious to the physical and mental well-being of a
person are prohibited.”28 It established the National House of Chiefs and the
Regional House of Chiefs and requires these institutions to study, interpret, and
compile customary laws with the goal of eliminating customs and usages that are
“outmoded and socially harmful.”29 In addition, a Law Reform Commission was
founded that has the power to propose new laws or changes in the existing law.30
The work of that Commission resulted in the enactment of the Intestate
Succession Law,31 which sought to unify the law relating to intestate succession
because various ethnic regions previously followed different succession rules.32
Finally, the Ghanaian courts themselves have at times held a custom to be
contrary to statute or natural justice. For example, in one case, appellants were
charged with the criminal offense of cremating a corpse without lawful
authority.33 They asserted as one ground of defense that the custom in the locality
required that the deceased, who had violated a custom but was not purified before
death, should be cremated rather than afforded a burial. Although the head of
family and paramount chief gave evidence testifying to the custom and the
appellants appeared genuinely to believe they had done no wrong, the court
upheld their conviction, finding the custom outmoded and contrary to public
25. Criminal law is also an essential part of their legal systems, but private resolution
of disputes among individuals and their family groups can avoid engagement of the
criminal process.
26. See Vanderlinden, supra note 1, at 1048.
27. See id.
28. GHANA CONST. art. 26(2).
29. See id. arts. 272(b)–(c), 274(3)(f).
30. See Law Reform Commission Decree, 1975, N.R.C.D. 325, § 2 (Ghana).
31. See Intestate Succession Law, 1985, P.N.D.C.L. 111 (Ghana).
32. This change was intended to more fully protect the interests of spouses,
particularly widows. See Jeanmarie Fenrich & Tracy E. Higgins, Promise Unfulfilled:
Law, Culture, and Women’s Inheritance Rights in Ghana, 25 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 259, 268
(2001).
33. See Foli VIII v. The Republic, [1968] G.L.R. 768 (Ghana).
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health rules that required the permission of a medical officer before setting fire to
a dead body.
B. A Description of Customary Tort Law in Ghana
Ghanaian customary tort law, like other areas of customary law, serves
the purpose of maintaining social equilibrium by redressing injuries that may be
individual or collective in nature. The injuries that would most disrupt the societal
balance are those that interfere with familial relationships. The Ghanaian family
is regarded as the basic unit and foundation of society, and its stability and
cohesion is essential for the organization, productivity, and indeed, survival of the
individual and the larger community.34 Professor W.C. Ekow-Daniels notes that
from the standpoint of customary law, the family is a collective or corporate unit
that remains undiminished by the death of its members.35 Customary torts may
threaten this ongoing genealogical unit, rupturing the bond among its members or
the social order between families. If members of the family are impugned through
insults, abusive language or words injurious to reputation, or if family bonds and
promises are broken through such actions as the customary tort of seduction, the
essence of the family’s identity and its place within society are placed in question.
This is one reason customary torts are taken so seriously. Ghanaian customary
tort law, however, provides more than a deterrent to disruptive social behavior.
Inherent in the concept of a broad and highly cohesive family is the acceptance of
unwavering responsibility for one’s family members and thus a notion of parental
liability that is more expansive than normally found in a common law system. 36
This focus on the group and customary law’s protection of the collective
interests in Ghana is best understood by recognizing that every culture falls in a
different place on the continuum between individualism and collectivism. As
Jeanne M. Brett explains:

34. The downside to a society based on kinship and solidarity is that when conflict
arises among individuals, it always carries the risk of escalating to pit one group against
another. This is the reason that traditional African societies exercised great care to contain
individual conflicts and prevent them from escalating. See GEORGE B. N. AYITTEY,
INDIGENOUS AFRICAN INSTITUTIONS 9 (1991).
35. See Ekow-Daniels, supra note 11. A consecrated stool or skin is the corporate
seal of the family, in which the souls of the deceased members are believed to reside. All
legal title to the family’s property is vested in the stool or the skin itself, and never in the
occupant of the stool or skin, for these are merely temporary custodians of the family’s
assets. See id.
36. See Frances M. Deng, The Family and the Law of Torts in African Customary
Law, 4 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 1−2 (1966) (discussing the concept of justice that requires family
members to answer for the torts of another).
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[This continuum] distinguishes between cultures that generally
place individuals’ interests above those of the collective and
cultures that generally place collective needs above those of
individuals. In individualist cultures social, economic, and legal
institutions promote the autonomy of individuals, reward
individual accomplishment, and protect individual rights. In
collective cultures institutions promote interdependency of
individuals with the others in their families, work
establishments, and communities by emphasizing social
obligations. Individual accomplishment [as well as failure]
reflects back on others with whom the individual is
interdependent. Legal institutions support collective interests
above individual interests.37
The collective focus of society in Ghana is reinforced by the descent system,
which categorizes individuals into lineages, families, and clans.38 Given Ghanaian
society’s corporate and collective character, it follows that customary tort law in
Ghana would focus on the group. In collective cultures, collective interests
generally take precedence over self-interests although people from collective
cultures also have self-interests that are important and protected.39
Before describing Ghanaian customary tort law in greater depth, it is
useful to place it in the context of the tort law of other legal systems that similarly
offer redress for dignitary and family torts that fall outside the protection of the
common law. As the Ghanaian jurist S.K. Date-Bah observed, “customary law is
not alone in providing a remedy against insult and affronts to personal dignity and

37. JEANNE M. BRETT, NEGOTIATING GLOBALLY: HOW TO NEGOTIATE DEALS,
RESOLVE DISPUTES, AND MAKE DECISIONS ACROSS CULTURAL BOUNDARIES 32–33 (2d ed.
2007).
38. Descent is the process by which a “direct genealogical connection is traced
between an individual and his forbearers or offspring for the purpose of recruitment into
kin groups.” G. K. NUKUNYA, TRADITION AND CHANGE IN GHANA: AN INTRODUCTION TO
SOCIOLOGY 19 (2d ed. 2003). There are two main descent groups: clans and lineages. A
clan is “a group of people, male and female, who are believed to have descended through
one line only (male or female) from a common putative ancestor or ancestress.” Id. A
lineage is “a group of people, male and female, who are descended through one line only
from a common ancestor or ancestress.” Id. at 21. The lineage is a segment of the clan
found in one locality. Thus, the difference between a clan and a lineage is that members of
lineage “are localized and know the genealogical ties that connect them to their founding
ancestor or ancestress.” Id.; see also Kojo Yelpaala, Western Anthropological Concepts in
Stateless Societies: A Retrospective and Introspective Look at the Dagaaba, 17
DIALECTICAL ANTHROPOLOGY 431, 446–47 (1992) (explaining these concepts in more
detail).
39. See BRETT, supra note 37.
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. . . it is no sign of backwardness for it to provide such a remedy.”40 First,
Ghanaian customary tort law is similar to the customary tort law of certain other
African countries, such as Nigeria, Uganda, and Kenya to mention a few.41 It
stands to reason that the underlying social structure and the practices that reinforce
it would be similar; the borders and institutions of the modern state are fairly
recent and artificial divisions. Second, under Roman law, the form of delict called
iniuria protected people from insults.42 Iniuria had a much broader scope than
providing redress for defamation.43 Roman law spread through Europe and the
British Isles and, eventually, to South Africa, where it became part of the
“received” law. Roman-Dutch law includes protection of various types of
individual feelings, providing greater remedies for injury than the common law.44
European civil law provides a final example of broader protection for
dignity and feelings than the common law affords. While Roman law was
replaced with customary law when the Roman Empire fell, it “came crashing
back” into Europe during the eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth centuries.45
Eventually, the civil law tradition emerged in Europe, as exemplified by the
Napoleonic Code in France.46 The Code included criminal defamation laws that
are still in effect and serve largely to protect members of the government from
insult.47 French law recognizes a distinction between injure, which protects from
insult and outrage, and diffimation, which protects reputation.48 The influential
French Code spurred other countries to adopt similar codes, some broader than the
French, criminalizing insults.49 These laws included protection of royal families
and national symbols from dishonor.50 Thus, numerous other countries impose
either criminal or civil liability for insults as distinguished from defamation,

40. S.K. Date-Bah, Reflections on the Law of Defamation in Ghana, [1973] 10 U.
GHANA L.J. 129, 135.
41. See, e.g., Jill Cottrell, The Functions of the Law of Torts in Africa, 31 J. AFRICAN
L. 161, 164 n.26, 165, 177–179 (1987); T. Olawale Elias, Insult as an Offence in African
Customary Law, 53 AFR. AFF. 66, 66 (1954).
42. See ANDREW BORKOWSKI & PAUL DU PLESSIS, TEXTBOOK ON ROMAN LAW § 10.4
(3d ed. 2005); see also Elena Yanchukova, Comment, Criminal Defamation and Insult
Laws: An Infringement on the Freedom of Expression in European and Post-Communist
Jurisdictions, 41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 861, 863 (2003).
43. See Date-Bah, supra note 40, at 134–35.
44. See CHITTHARANJAN FELIX AMERASINGHE, DEFAMATION AND OTHER ASPECTS OF
THE ACTIO INIURIARUM IN ROMAN-DUTCH LAW 320–26 (1968); Cottrell, supra note 41, at
165; Date-Bah, supra note 40.
45. See GLENN, supra note 1, at 132.
46. See Yanchukova, supra note 42.
47. See id.
48. See Date-Bah, supra note 40.
49. See Yanchukova, supra note 42, 887–88.
50. See id.
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although the interests they seek to protect are different from those embodied in
customary tort law in Ghana.51
African customary tort law “rigorously discourages any conduct, whether
by word or deed, that is likely to lead to a disturbance of the peace of the
community.”52 Insults have the potential to trigger an explosive outbreak among
people who live together in a very tight-knit society53 and, for that reason, they are
taken very seriously. Justice Sophia Akuffo of the Supreme Court of Ghana
explained their significance in a criminal defamation case, stating that:
[r]ecent events in certain parts of this country prove that our
society is presently one in which expressions and allegations
against persons, whether oral or written, can have far-reaching
consequences (both as a result of the public acting upon the
allegations or the accused person seeking to defend himself),
including breach of the peace, mob action, mass hysteria and
even loss of lives. Allegations made against persons, whatever
be their station in life, still have the potential power to cause
immediate effect.54
Ghanaian customary law reflects this view; courts have found the tort of
slander applicable when a plaintiff is called a “witch,”55 “slave,”56 “prostitute,”57
“useless fellow and a non-native of the town,”58 “mad woman,”59 and “hopeless
lawyer and a hopeless M.P.”60 In one famous case, the plaintiff was told during an
angry exchange that “her vagina stinks.”61 In another case, the plaintiff claimed
damages because she was “hooted at in public in a Ghanaian village” by someone
51. Increasingly the European Court of Human Rights has found the application of
some of these laws problematic in light of these countries’ ratification of the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“ECHR”). See JULIE A.
DAVIES & PAUL T. HAYDEN, GLOBAL ISSUES IN TORT LAW 245–52 (2008) (discussing
impact of the European Court of Human Rights and its interpretation of the ECHR); see
also Yanchukova, supra note 42, at 877–83 (discussing the landmark decisions of the
European Court of Human Rights).
52. Elias, supra note 41.
53. See id.
54. Republic v. Tommy Thompson Books Ltd., [1997–1998] 1 G.L.R. 611, 644
(Ghana).
55. See Afriyie v. Dansowah, [1976] 2 G.L.R. 172 (Ghana); Abotchie v. Nuumo,
[1974] 1 G.L.R. 142 (Ghana).
56. See Nkrumah v. Manu, [1971] 1 G.L.R. 176 (Ghana); Ampong v. Aboraa, [1960]
G.L.R. 29 (Ghana).
57. See Serwah v. Sefa, [1984–1986] 2 G.L.R. 390 (Ghana).
58. See Sogbaka v. Tamakloe, [1973] 1 G.L.R. 25 (Ghana).
59. See Adjuah Attah v. Abbah Attah, [1961] G.L.R. 77 (Ghana).
60. See Bonsu v. Forson, [1962] 1 G.L.R. 139 (Ghana).
61. See Wankiyiwaa v. Wereduwaa, [1963] 1 G.L.R. 322 (Ghana).
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alleging she had stolen money.62 While allegations of theft would, of course,
impair reputation, it was clear that the grievance encompassed insult as much or
more than injury to reputation.63
These insults are taken seriously by judges, in large part because they
may affect and damage the group to which the complainant belongs as much as, if
not more than, the complainant individually. Although under the common law
many of these insults would fall beyond the reach of the law, due to Ghanaian
culture and history, the words have a power to them that is as explosive as any
slander per se.64 For example, witchcraft and wizardry are believed to be
inherited65 and to signify a predisposition to harming others. An allegation of
slavery has negative implications for an entire ethnic group, signifying that they
are not who they purport to be, or that they are not of good lineage, or that they
are servants of a lower social status.66 This is true even though slavery has long
been abolished.67 Accusations of prostitution or adultery implicate a family group
because sexual relations outside of marriage, or in betrayal of one’s spouse,
threaten the union that has been created between the families of the bride and the
groom and bring shame on them.68 Physical traits, such as a lack of intelligence or
talent, have an obvious bearing on one’s heredity and upbringing and, hence, may
insult the collective from which the individual descends.
Another form of customary tort liability arises when a wife or child is
seduced to leave the family home. While the torts of seduction and enticement
have frequently been abolished in common law systems, Ghana retains both
common law and customary law variants.69 The common law torts in Ghana
protect the fairly narrow interest of the husband in the comfort and society of the
enticed wife, or for the loss of her services.70 In contrast, the customary tort of
seduction seeks to protect the integrity and moral character of the family of the
parties involved. In fact, one of the elements of the tort, in addition to proof that

62. See Adai v. Kwabena, [1970] No. 30/67 Civ. (Ghana), discussed in Date-Bah,
supra note 40.
63. See id.
64. The allegation that a woman is a prostitute would be slander per se, and
actionable without special damages under the common law rules. See infra note 83 and
accompanying text.
65. See Deng, supra note 36, at 23 (discussing the link between witchcraft and the
family among the Dinka and the Nuer people).
66. See Kwame Anthony Appiah, A Slow Emancipation, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2007
(discussing the continuing stigma of descent from slaves in the Ashanti region more than
one hundred years after abolition of slavery).
67. See GHANA CONST. art. 16(1).
68. See generally Deng, supra note 36, at 4–11 (discussing the meaning of adultery
in Africa).
69. See L.K. Agbosu, Seduction Actions in Ghana: Benya v. Lawani, 16 REV. GHANA
L. 171 (1987–1988).
70. See id.
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the victim of seduction left the home and suffered a wrong at the hands of the
defendant, is that the incident brought disgrace on the family.71 From a policy
perspective, the tort recognizes that by breaking the bonds of marriage through
seduction, or by seducing an unmarried woman, a defendant is disrespecting the
traditional norms, and undermining the institution of the family and the authority
of parents and elders that sustain the health, unity, and cohesion of the family and
society at large.72
Under principles of customary law, a father is liable for a son’s
misconduct with a woman if the father has not obtained a wife for the son by the
time the son has reached puberty.73 As explained by Justice Wiredu, who later
became the Chief Justice of Ghana, the rule holding a father primarily liable for
the immoral conduct of his son is based not only on the physical control exercised
by a father over his son, but on the responsibility to give the son a moral
upbringing and to make provisions for his future marriage.74 Justice Wiredu
explains the principle as the complement to the customary tort of seduction; it
would be unconscionable and strange to recognize a parent’s cause of action
against the seducer of his unmarried daughter and “then exonerate him of
reciprocal responsibility for the immoral conduct of his son.”75 To be sure,
Wiredu recognized that in some cases a parent should escape liability,76 but he
reaffirmed his belief in the correctness of the general liability principle.77
Ghana’s customary torts are differentiated not only by their broader-thancommon-law reach, but also by their remedies. In customary law actions, the goal
of the plaintiff is to restore his or her standing in the community and not to make
money. John Mensah Sarbah, a famous lawyer who wrote on Ghanaian
customary law, described the remedies as consisting of public retraction in
addition to payment of a small fine. The confession of disgraceful behavior would
71. See id.
72. See id. Agbosu suggests that given changes in Ghanaian society, at least in some
urban areas, courts might update the elements of the customary law action for seduction if
they ascertain that mores have changed. See id.
73. “Not only is a father liable to maintain his child, but if he fail [sic] to obtain a
wife for his son on reaching the age of puberty, he is liable for damages arising from the
son’s misconduct with any woman.” Addae v. Asante, [1974] 2 G.L.R. 288, 291 (Ghana)
(quoting JOHN MENSAH SARBAH, FANTI CUSTOMARY LAWS 39 (2d ed. 1904)).
74. See Gyan v. Dabrah, [1974] 2 G.L.R. 318, 323–24 (Ghana).
75. See id.
76. See id. To escape liability for the son or daughter’s misconduct, a parent must
establish that the son or daughter has been emancipated out of boyhood, attained the age of
manhood and is in control of his or her own affairs. See id.
77. See id. This particular rule is perhaps best understood as part of a broader
concept of family liability. Membership in a family carries rights, such as common
ownership of property and the right to sit in on family council meetings, as well as
responsibilities, such as the obligation to discharge family debts. See OLLENNU’S
PRINCIPLES OF CUSTOMARY LAND LAW IN GHANA 149 (N.A. Ollennu & G.R. Woodman
eds., 2d ed. 1985).
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provoke jeers and sneers that were punishment enough for the offender.78
Professor S.K. Date-Bah explains that because the fine is payable to the plaintiff,
and not to the stool,79 it is more in the nature of damages than a criminal
sanction.80
C. Comparison with U.S. Common Law Principles
In almost all respects except damages, Ghanaian customary tort law is
broader and more encompassing than U.S. common law.81 The common law of
torts suggests several avenues that might apply to the types of cases brought under
customary law, the most relevant of which are slander and intentional infliction of
emotional distress. Slander, though it descends from the broader Roman concept
of iniuria,82 is not a tort that is easy to establish. Although, under common law
principles, slander is a strict liability tort, the requirement that the plaintiff prove
special damages (pecuniary loss) in all but cases falling within the areas
considered slander per se83 makes it likely that many slander actions will fail.84
Even if the plaintiff could prove special damages, or that the alleged defamatory
statement falls within a per se category, she could not prevail without proving in
addition that the statement was defamatory in that it would tend to lower the
plaintiff in the esteem of a “substantial and respectable minority” of the

78. See Date-Bah, supra note 40 (citing JOHN MENSAH SARBAH, FANTI CUSTOMARY
LAWS 113−14 (3d ed. 1968)).
79. Literally, a stool is the seat of the Chief or other similarly placed individual who
rules over a particular community. It is a symbol of authority in Southern Ghana. The
Northern Ghana equivalent of a stool is the “skin.” These concepts are often personified.
Thus, land may be called stool land or skin land, meaning land belonging to the
community. The 1992 Constitution provides a definition for “stool,” though it is not a
helpful one. Article 295(1) defines stool as “includ[ing] a skin, and the person or body of
persons having control over skin land.” GHANA CONST. art. 295(1). Thus, a stool or skin in
one sense represents a person, or body of persons, who will have authority over skin land or
stool land.
80. See Date-Bah, supra note 40, at 143.
81. One might, of course, contrast Ghanaian customary law with the common law of
many other countries, or with the common law of Ghana itself. The comparison with U.S.
law was selected because of the authors’ greater familiarity with it. There are great
similarities between the English, Ghanaian and the American common law of torts, but we
have not attempted to cover all bases.
82. See supra notes 42–43 and accompanying text.
83. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 408, at 1141–42 (2000) (“Slander per se
is that which charges a (1) serious criminal offense or one of moral turpitude, (2) a
‘loathsome’ and communicable disease, (3) any matter incompatible with business, trade,
profession, or office, and sometimes, (4) serious sexual misconduct.” (footnotes omitted)).
84. See id.
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community.85 The alleged defamatory statement must allege actual facts that
would be “reasonably believable.”86 Even if slander per se is alleged and the other
elements of the common law case are proven, a plaintiff in the U.S. may be
required to meet the very demanding “actual malice” standards imposed by New
York Times v. Sullivan87 or Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.88 For the plaintiff who
navigates these obstacles, recovery is possible, and potentially large, particularly
if the plaintiff can demonstrate that the statement fell within a slander per se
category.89
Some statements that fall within the boundaries of Ghanaian customary
law certainly could also be litigated as common law claims in the U.S. or in
Ghana, but many could not. Calling a woman a “prostitute” clearly impugns
chastity or sexual mores,90 and hooting out an allegation of theft qualifies as an
accusation of a crime of serious moral turpitude.91 However, at least in modern
common law jurisprudence, comments charging a person of being a “slave,”
“crazy,” or “useless” are unlikely to be viewed as potentially slanderous or
believable and would more probably be considered abuses merely uttered to blow
off steam that do not support a claim.92 Even if a claim can be stated, the
complexity of common law defamation actions93 usually necessitates that the
plaintiff retain an attorney, thus posing an additional barrier to recovery.
Under U.S. law, another way to approach some of the insults for which
customary law allows recovery94 would be to frame them as claims for intentional
85. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 cmt. e (1977); see also id. § 403, at
1127.
86. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 57 (1988) (affirming Court of
Appeals ruling that ad parody of plaintiff was not reasonably believable and hence libel
claim must be dismissed).
87. See 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (requiring proof of knowledge of falsity or reckless
disregard for truth in a case brought by a public official).
88. See 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (private plaintiff must prove fault to recover actual
damages, and knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for truth to recover presumed and
punitive damages).
89. See, e.g., Purgess v. Sharrock, 33 F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 1994) (anesthesiologist
awarded $3,500,000 when defamation by employer caused him to lose job); United Ins. Co.
of Am. v. Murphy, 961 S.W.2d 752 (Ark. 1998) (insurance agent awarded $600,000 in
action against her employer); see generally Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Excessiveness or
Inadequacy of Compensatory Damages for Defamation, 49 A.L.R.4th 1158 (1986).
90. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 574 cmt. b.
91. See id. § 571.
92. See id. § 566 cmt. e.
93. See DOBBS, supra note 83, § 401, at 1119–20.
94. Ghanaian customary law recognizes the interest in compensating for hurt
feelings. For instance, in Wankyiwaa v. Wereduwaa, the defendant spoke and published a
statement about the plaintiff that “her vagina stinks.” The plaintiff brought an action in
slander for damages. Affirming a judgment in her favor, the High Court, per Justice
Apaloo, stated: “In this country, where words of abuse are taken seriously, it would, in my
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infliction of emotional distress.95 Although under U.S. law this tort is intended to
be very narrow, in keeping with the courts’ suspicion of pure emotional injuries, it
also has the potential to be quite broad. The narrowness of the tort is evident in
cases that refuse to impose liability for insults, even when the insults consist of
racial epithets of the worst kind. The Restatement (Second) makes a distinction
between words that are “merely offensive” or “mere insults” that must be endured
in our rough and tumble society and conduct that is “extreme and outrageous,” or
beyond that which is tolerable in a civilized society.96 To Ghanaians living under
the customary rules, the dichotomy between “extreme and outrageous conduct”
and “mere insults” does not make sense.97 Calling an African-American one of
the most insulting epithets possible to utter would surely be on par with calling
someone a slave, yet, in the U.S., it is rarely actionable standing alone.98
Although U.S. torts scholars, such as Richard Delgado99 and Jean Love,100 have
criticized the narrowness of the U.S. approach and explained the harm to
plaintiffs, the courts have not been persuaded. In part, this is because of their
belief that the First Amendment protects such speech, even if it is hurtful, and
limits the state’s ability to protect the victims.101
Despite the narrowness of intentional infliction as it applies to insults, its
breadth may allow it to encompass certain dignitary torts that injure the family, at
least if they do not conflict with contrary law within the state. As Daniel Givelber
has argued, intentional infliction of emotional distress “provides no clear

opinion, be socially intolerable if customary law provided no sanctions against a man who
finds pleasure in injuring the feelings of his neighbour by vituperation. . . . [A]buse by itself
is a wrong redressible by damages according to customary law.” [1963] 1 G.L.R. 332
(Ghana) (emphasis added).
95. The elements are enumerated in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965),
which provides: “(1) One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or
recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such
emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily harm.”
96. See id. cmt. d.
97. In the Ghanaian context, at least at the customary law level, no such distinction is
made, although not every word of abuse is actionable. See Wankyiwaa, [1963] 1 G.L.R.
332.
98. See DOBBS, supra note 83, § 305, at 830–31 (“Courts are clearly reluctant to
impose liability for epithets, racial or otherwise, in the absence of repetition or aggravating
factors.”).
99. Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets,
and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133 (1982).
100. Jean Love, Discriminatory Speech and the Tort of Intentional Infliction of
Emotional Distress, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 123 (1990).
101. See MARK A. FRANKLIN, ROBERT L. RABIN & MICHAEL C. GREEN, TORT LAW AND
ALTERNATIVES 914–15 (8th ed. 2006).
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definition of the prohibited conduct.”102 It does not objectively describe the acts
intended to be encompassed within the tort, and thus “fails to provide clear
guidance either to those whose conduct it purports to regulate, or to those who
must evaluate that conduct.”103
Ironically, this lack of clarity has prompted plaintiffs, who are injured
because a defendant has broken up their families, to attempt to redress the injury
through the action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. 104 The common
law torts that used to address these family injuries directly were “criminal
conversation,” which involved sexual intercourse by an outsider with a husband or
wife, or “alienation of affections,” which occurred when outsiders tried to
interrupt the relations among family members.105 While these torts were long
recognized by the common law courts, more than half of the states in the U.S.
have abolished them by judicial decision or statute.106 One court reasoned that the
tort of criminal conversation was a means of exacting revenge and might ruin the
defendant’s reputation.107 Further, the court believed that because the wrongful
conduct involved sex, a tort action with its risk of damages liability would be
unlikely to deter the defendant.108 Actions for breach of promise to marry109 and
seduction110 have likewise been abolished in many places. Thus, in the U.S.,
plaintiffs try, and a few succeed, in recasting these injuries to the family as
intentional infliction of emotional distress cases.111 Many courts see these claims
as efforts to circumvent the abolition of the family and relationship torts and do
not permit them.112
The case law makes it apparent that, whether denominated as alienation
of affections, criminal conversation or intentional infliction of emotional distress,
at least some people in the U.S. still perceive the need for redress in situations

102. Daniel Givelber, The Right to Minimum Social Decency and the Limits of
Evenhandedness: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress by Outrageous Conduct, 82
COLUM. L. REV. 42, 51 (1982).
103. Id.
104. See FRANKLIN, RABIN & GREEN, supra note 101, at 920–922; see also DOBBS,
supra note 83, § 442, at 1245–49.
105. See DOBBS, supra note 83, § 442, at 1246–47.
106. See id. at 1247–48.
107. See Neal v. Neal, 873 P.2d 871 (Idaho 1994), cited in FRANKLIN, RABIN &
GREEN, supra note 101, at 920–21.
108. See id.
109. RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 62:29 (4th ed. 2002).
110. DOBBS, supra note 83, § 443, at 1249, 1252.
111. Compare C.M. v. J.M., 726 A.2d 998 (N.J. Super Ct. Ch. Div. 1999)
(recognizing intentional infliction claim for effect of wife’s adulterous affair on husband
and children), with McDermott v. Reynolds, 530 S.E.2d 902 (Va. 2000) (rejecting
intentional infliction claim on similar facts), and Bouchard v. Sundberg, 834 A.2d 744, 757
(Conn. App. Ct. 2003) (rejecting claim).
112. See, e.g., McDermott, 530 S.E.2d 902.
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similar to those raised by the customary tort of seduction.113 It is unclear whether
their reasons are actually retaliation and damages, as the courts suggest, or a
desire for healing. Unlike the situation in Ghana, it is unlikely that a judgment in
favor of the plaintiff in the U.S. will restore the harmony of a family group,
because litigation rarely has that effect. However, the core desire to right the
wrong committed to a family unit through tort is a commonality with Ghanaian
customary law. Many U.S. courts have chosen to view these injuries to the family
unit as non-cognizable in tort, despite widespread acknowledgement of the injury
in other contexts.114
There is nothing in U.S. law that approximates the customary Ghanaian
rule obligating a father to answer for the moral shortfalls of his son when the
father has not properly arranged the young man’s marriage. As a general rule,
parents are not vicariously liable for the torts of their children.115 Children may
hurt others through negligence or intentional torts, but while they may be held
personally liable for the damages they inflict, the courts believe it would be highly
unfair to impose the cost on the parents.116 Under the law of negligence, parents
have affirmative duties to control or monitor the conduct of their children to
prevent physical harms to others if the parents have both the ability to do so and
knowledge of the need to do it.117 In such instances, the parents are held
accountable for their own negligence. It would be inconceivable to find parents at
fault or vicariously liable for a child’s sexual dalliances.118 Children are expected
to make their own way in the world as far as finding love and marrying, and it
would be viewed as unjust to blame a parent for moral lapses of an unmarried son.
With regard to remedy, it seems fair to say that the Ghanaian customary
remedies are powerful, yet relatively gentle, while the U.S. common law remedies
range from extremely harsh to non-existent. Ghanaian jurist S.K. Date-Bah
compared common and customary law remedies in the context of lawsuits for
insult or slander and concluded that the customary remedies had distinctive
advantages.119 Because damages are minimized in customary law, people have a
113. See DOBBS, supra note 83, § 442, at 1245–49.
114. See generally Paul R. Amato, The Consequences of Divorce for Adults and
Children, 62 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 1269 (2000) (detailing the harmful effects divorce can
have on all family members).
115. See DOBBS, supra note 83, § 340, at 935; but see 59 AM. JUR. 2D PARENT AND
CHILD § 103 (1987) (liability may be imposed in some instances by statute, for example, for
vandalism, destruction of property or taking a vehicle without permission).
116. See WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 123 (4th ed. 1971).
117. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 316 (1965).
118. See, e.g., Bowen v. Mewborn, 11 S.E.2d 372, 374–75 (N.C. 1949) (rejecting
argument that because the father gave his son “lustful and lascivious” advice he should be
liable for his son’s sexual misconduct); see also Zapalski v. Benton, 444 N.W.2d 171
(Mich. Ct. App. 1989) (parents could not foresee sexual misconduct on the part of their
child).
119. See Date-Bah, supra note 40, at 139.
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disincentive to sue for financial gain, or as Date-Bah puts it, to sell their good
name for money.120 The common law remedies lack the public dimension of name
clearing that accompanies the customary remedies.121 Many common law jurists
would agree with Date-Bah’s critique of common law damages in defamation
cases.122 It is frequently asserted that many plaintiffs want nothing more than to
clear their names or to gain an apology, and it is difficult to do so.123 At the same
time, in the rare instances where presumed damages are imposed, the common law
rules have the potential to be economically burdensome. This can even occur in
situations where there is no culpability on the part of the defendant.124
The common law rules pertaining to damages for intentional or negligent
infliction of emotional distress generally require that the plaintiff plead and prove
a specified level of harm. In general, they require proof of “severe injury,” with
some requiring evidence of actual physical injury in addition to the emotional
harm.125 These requirements are in large part a response to the mistrust in the U.S.
of the genuineness of emotional distress claims and the view that hurt feelings are
not an injury worthy of the legal system’s intervention. If a plaintiff cannot meet
these harm thresholds, no remedy is available, even if the defendant’s conduct was
intentionally hurtful. Once again, this rule system stands in stark contrast to the
rules of Ghanaian customary tort law.

120. See id.
121. See id.; see also Janet Daniels, Protecting the Chastity of a Modest Matron, 1
REV. GHANA L. 27, 31 (1973) (arguing that customary law would have provided a more
reasonable result in a common law defamation suit brought against a university. Daniels
posits that the customary remedy would have allowed the plaintiff to salvage her honor
while the university would not have been “mulcted” in damages. Further, the customary
remedy would have discouraged future litigation which, in the author’s view, did not
advance women’s rights.).
122. See, e.g., George E. Frasier, Note, An Alternative to the General Damage Award
for Defamation, 20 STAN. L. REV. 504 (1968) (arguing that general damages neither
adequately protect a plaintiff’s reputation, nor adequately promote the free flow of accurate
information in media).
123. See id. at 505 (arguing that money damages are ineffective in addressing injury to
one’s reputation because money will not likely rehabilitate reputation and may actually
harm the plaintiff, who will be seen as a “scoundrel concerned not with vindicating his
reputation but with collecting a money judgment.”).
124. See, e.g., Snead v. Redland Aggregates Ltd., 998 F.2d 1325 (5th Cir. 1993)
(affirming jury verdict of $1 in compensatory damages and $500,000 in punitive damages
and concluding that the Constitution imposes no minimum standard of fault in private
person/private concern libel cases).
125. See DOBBS, supra note 83, § 306, at 832–33.
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III. THE FUTURE OF GHANAIAN CUSTOMARY TORT
Ghanaian society today is more complex than in years past. Its legal
system must be responsive to a wide diversity of needs and traditions. It must
serve people in modern cities and rural villages who seek redress under both
common and customary law principles. The justice system utilizes the expertise
of judges, who range from western-educated lawyers to traditional Chiefs who,
with or without formal legal training, perform many dispute-resolution functions.
It must serve not only English speakers, but individuals in many ethnic groups
who prefer to speak in their mother tongues.
As Ghanaians move from their traditional homelands to avail themselves
of educational and employment opportunities, one wonders whether they will
continue to abide by customary practices and seek customary law remedies for
wrongs committed against them. Many factors will likely influence the future of
customary tort law. One important consideration is the extent to which Ghana’s
legal system, Constitution, laws, and other societal institutions protect and
promote customary law. As our analysis below demonstrates, the legal system is
highly protective and affirmatively supportive of customary law. The 1992
Constitution ensures customary law a significant role in Ghanaian society for as
long as Ghanaians continue to want it. Thus, its future will depend on whether the
Ghanaians will continue to seek recovery using customary tort law rather than
availing themselves of common law torts, and whether courts will give effect to
the customary practices.
A. The Role of the Constitution, Laws, and Other Institutions
The 1992 Constitution includes the rules of customary law as part of the
laws of Ghana.126 Because of this, customary law is on a par with common law
rules, statutes, and the Constitution itself,127 as well as other “existing law” as
sources of law in Ghana. In drafting the Constitution, the framers defined
“existing law” to include the unwritten laws existing before the Constitution came
into force.128 The inclusion of customary law and existing law in our view reflects
the framers’ desire to recognize and protect the socio-cultural diversity of
Ghanaian society, which includes no less than forty-six ethnic groups, each of

126. See GHANA CONST. arts. 11(1)(e), (2); see also supra note 2 and accompanying
text.
127. Unless “customary practices . . . dehumanise or are injurious to the physical and
mental well-being of a person,” in which case, they “are prohibited.” GHANA CONST. art.
26(2).
128. See id. art. 11(4).
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which has its own indigenous cultural norms, mores, and values that regulate
social conduct and economic life.129
The Constitution of Ghana also gives every person the right “to enjoy,
practise, profess, maintain and promote any culture, language, tradition or religion
subject to the provisions of th[e] Constitution.”130 The regulation of the social life
and conduct of the community through customary law is one way of expressing
and professing cultural beliefs and practices; customary law is an expression of
cultural beliefs and practices. Any effort to affirmatively curtail the adherence to
customary tradition and the reliance on customary law to enforce it would
derogate the right to enjoy, practice, and profess one’s culture. Of course, there
are limits. The Constitution provides that “[a]ll customary practices which
dehumanise or are injurious to the physical and mental well-being of a person are
prohibited.”131 This provision merely authorizes other Ghanaian institutions, such
as the courts or the House of Chiefs, to invalidate a customary practice on a caseby-case basis, and thus does not undermine the general applicability of customary
law principles in Ghanaian society.
The Constitution of Ghana does more than protect the rights of
Ghanaians to practice and enjoy their traditional ways. Article 39 underscores the
importance of traditional and indigenous norms by providing that “the State shall
take steps to encourage the integration of appropriate customary values into the
fabric of national life through formal and informal education and the conscious
introduction of cultural dimensions to relevant aspects of national planning.”132
Other provisions speak to the obligation of the State to foster development of
Ghanaian languages and pride in Ghanaian culture,133 as well as to “ensure that
appropriate customary and cultural values are adapted and developed as an
integral part” of the needs of society and that traditional practices that are
“injurious to the health and well-being of the person are abolished.”134 These
affirmative obligations on the State ensure that customary practices will be taught
and respected.
The institution of chieftaincy is protected by the Constitution,135 and
chiefs are the repositories of customary law.136 Parliament is prohibited from
making laws that “detract[] or derogate[] from the honour and dignity of the
institution of chieftaincy.”137 Chiefs, along with their councils, serve important
129. See Acquah, supra note 20; Ogwurike, supra note 16.
130. GHANA CONST. art. 26(1). Article 21(1)(b)–(c) provides for freedom of thought,
conscience, and belief and freedom to practice any religion and to manifest such practice.
See id. art. 21(1)(b)–(c).
131. Id. art. 26(2).
132. Id. art. 39(1). A Ministry of Culture has been created to achieve these goals.
133. See GHANA CONST. art. 39(3).
134. Id. art. 39(2).
135. See id. art. 270(1).
136. See Acquah, supra note 20.
137. GHANA CONST. art. 270(2)(b).
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judicial and advisory functions in the community,138 such as the settlement of
disputes, maintenance of peace and order, and championing development
initiatives. Today, even in urban environments, chiefs advise as to what custom
and usage is and settle disputes between people. The National and Regional
Houses of Chiefs are also charged with the “study, interpretation and codification
of customary law, with a view to evolving, in appropriate cases, a unified system
of rules . . . and compiling the customary laws” and evaluating “those customs and
usages that are outmoded and socially harmful.”139
The constitutional provisions discussed above, the maintenance of the
institution of Chieftaincy, and the creation of a whole ministry on culture make
clear that customary law in general, and customary tort law in particular, are an
important part of Ghana’s legal system. The National House of Chiefs or the
Regional House of Chiefs might decide to eliminate or consolidate certain
practices, reducing the breadth of legally-accepted customary practices, but it
appears unlikely that customary tort law will disappear altogether.
B. The Role of the Courts
Given the prominence of customary law in the Constitution and the
support for it in institutions such as the various Houses of Chiefs, it is surprising
how actively judges analyze and scrutinize customary tort law. There have been a
number of cases where Ghanaian judges have criticized customary tort principles.
In one of the most famous, Nkrumah v. Manu,140 Justice Taylor was critical of the
customary tort of slander and indicated he thought it was time that the law was
changed. He could see the rationale for it in the days when village communities
were small and the spoken word was the only means of social or commercial
communication.141 However, Taylor thought that in light of the drastic changes
brought by modern civilization, Ghana had “more serious problems to tackle than
silly vituperation.”142 Professor Date-Bah agreed with Taylor that the law should
develop to deny Ghanaians civil remedies for insults.143 This view flew in the face
of J.B. Danquah’s assertion in his book, Cases in Akan Law, that “[t]he delicate

138. In the days before colonization, head chiefs, or kings, held power over their
various indigenous states, and under them were chiefs of regional districts and villages.
See Acquah, supra note 20.
139. GHANA CONST. art. 272(b)–(c); see generally Chieftaincy Act, 1971, §§ 40–46
(Ghana).
140. [1971] 1 G.L.R. 176, 181–82 (Ghana).
141. See id. at 181.
142. Id. at 182.
143. See S.K. Date-Bah, The Law of Slander in Ghana: A Sequel to Attiase v.
Abobbtey, 3 REV. GHANA L. 164 (1971).
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feelings of the average African are not half as blunted and atrophied as those of
the average European . . . .”144
While Justice Taylor’s view was that the law should not cater to the
Ghanaians’ sensitive feelings, other judges have disagreed. In Wankiyiwaa v.
Wereduwaa,145 Justice Apaloo acknowledged that the offending statement was
made to the plaintiff in anger and constituted plain vituperation, but stated:
[t]he fact that the law of England provides no remedy is quite
beside the point . . . . In this country, where words of abuse are
taken seriously, it would in my opinion, be socially intolerable if
customary law provided no sanctions against a man who finds
pleasure in injuring the feelings of his neighbor by
vituperation.146
Similar disagreements emerged between judges with respect to the
customary law rule holding a father liable for his son’s misconduct with a woman.
In one case, Justice Edusei stated that it was against good conscience to permit
this custom to exist,
[in] present times, when present-day children are asserting their
freedom of action and thought in diverse ways. If the son is old
enough to know what is sex, and in these days when there is
nothing esoteric about sex, I cannot see by what stretch of legal
ingenuity a parent should be saddled with his son’s
irresponsibility.147
Another Ghanaian judge reached the opposite conclusion in a case
decided the same year. Justice Wiredu acknowledged that:
it is an undeniable fact that the present days’ events cannot be
said to be the same as in the past when any talk of free love was
intolerable, sex by the youth . . . has become a common feature
in our society and therefore justifies a call for a new look and
consideration of this aspect of the custom . . . .148
However, Justice Wiredu viewed disregard of the custom as a highly undesirable
and also unjustifiable development. In his mind, it would encourage parental
144. J. B. DANQUAH, CASES IN AKAN LAW xxiii (1928).
145. [1963] 1 G.L.R. 332 (Ghana) (the case in which the plaintiff was told that “her
vagina stinks”).
146. Id. at 335.
147. Addae v. Asante, [1974] 2 G.L.R. 288, 291 (Ghana).
148. Gyan v. Dabrah, [1974] 2 G.L.R. 318, 323 (Ghana).
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abdication of a duty to control the moral conduct of children and encourage
“unchecked moral degeneration of youth generally.”149 Thus, even considering
the custom in a modern context, Justice Wiredu came out in its favor.
Ghanaian judges, then, have shown a willingness to rethink and
reevaluate issues of customary law despite the prominence and protection it
enjoys in the current and previous constitutions of Ghana. They have declared
that a customary law permitting trespass on tenants’ land and the cutting of palm
trees was unenforceable, asserting that “[w]e cannot imagine an arrangement more
ruinous of agricultural enterprise, subversive of expansion and consequently
prejudicial to national development . . . .”150 They have also been willing to
invalidate a custom that discriminates solely on the basis of sex, such as a rule
forbidding a woman from succeeding to her father’s property because succession
was patrilineal.151 But it is likewise clear that they have disagreed with one
another as to whether it is appropriate to disregard a custom, such as destruction
of crops, when it does not constitute a serious offense. In one case, the High
Court opined that even if a custom might appear to conflict with the common law
or appear to be contrary to public policy or to lack a clear moral objective, a court
should be slow to reject it or suggest a change.152
Perhaps the internal conflict is best summed up by the fact that two years
after he had agreed with Justice Taylor that Ghanaians should no longer be able to
bring suit for insults and vituperation, S.K. Date-Bah thought better of his views,
and in a subsequent article, he questioned whether it is “unenlightened for the law
of torts to provide a remedy against abuse,” and whether it is “permissible to use
the law of torts to change a particular feature of the mores of the Ghanaian
community.”153 On the merits of the question, he noted that refusing to provide a
remedy for insult will not necessarily make Ghanaians less sensitive to it. “It may
merely lead to insulted Ghanaians taking the law into their own hands or at least
speaking ill of the law for not giving just redress to their felt grievances.”154
In sum, notwithstanding the fact that the customary law is part of the
laws of Ghana under the 1992 Constitution, Ghanaian judges sometimes
encounter difficulty when asked to decide cases where customary law controls.
They may disagree with one another as to the scope of their authority to decide
whether to enforce customary law in the face of a challenge that it violates the
Constitution. As one Ghanaian Supreme Court justice observed, there is an
enormous difference between the judges and the communities in which they sit,
149. See id. at 323–24. Justice Wiredu’s position is consistent with current Ghanaian
statutory law; see e.g., Children’s Act, 1998 (Act 560), § 6(3)(a)(b) (recognizing a parent’s
duty to protect a child from “neglect, discrimination, violence, abuse, exposure to physical
and moral hazards and oppression.”).
150. See Attah v. Esson, [1976] 1 G.L.R. 128, 132 (Ghana).
151. See Akrofi v. Akrofi, [1965] G.L.R. 13 (Ghana).
152. See Abaye v. Akotia, [1982–1983] G.L.R.D. 109 (Ghana).
153. Date-Bah, supra note 40, at 133.
154. Id.
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both in terms of education and socio-economic class.155 To the extent that
customs differ from one ethnic community to another, full-blown choice of law
issues must be resolved. Yet, despite the challenges, a homogeneous English
common law of torts would not do justice to the ethnic diversity of Ghana.156
Ghanaian judges will continue to navigate these legal and policy questions in the
coming years.157
C. The People
As it stands now, Ghanaian citizens may be the ones with the most
influence over the application of customary tort law in the future. Its future
depends on the desire of citizens to invoke its protections and embrace its values.
Several factors can be identified as potentially undermining the hold of customary
tort law in Ghana. First, the prevailing religions in Ghana may influence what
people perceive as offensive and whether they seek to recover for it. Ghana is a
largely Christian country, with a Muslim minority. There are also a significant
number of Ghanaians who believe in and practice a traditional African system of
worship and belief. Neither Christianity nor Islam sanctions the belief in
witchcraft and wizardry, but traditional religions do. It may be that, in the future,
people will find it preposterous to seek relief under the customary tort of slander
for being called witches or wizards because they have ceased to believe in
witchcraft.
Second, as Ghanaians attend school and attain higher education, they
may reject traditional Ghanaian practices. This is particularly so as most educated
Ghanaian men and women tend to be Christian or Muslim. Their education,
combined with their belief system, may well diminish the customary law tradition.
It may also be that changes in the structure of society will fragment customary
practice. Although the institution of Chieftaincy is still vibrant, there may come a

155. See Mobido Acran, The Clash of Legal Cultures: The Treatment of Indigenous
Law in Colonial and Post-Colonial Africa, 39 AKRON L. REV. 465, 479 (2006) (noting that
many of the judges are western-educated and not particularly well-grounded in customary
law).
156. See S.Y. Bimpong-Buta, Customary Mores and the Sale of Photographs of a
Married Woman, 5 REV. GHANA L. 23–27 (1973) (“Just as customary rules as to
inheritance and succession governing every citizen in Ghana depend upon the tribe or
society to which that person belongs, so it is that each tribe or society in Ghana has its own
beliefs and estimation as to what constitutes [a tort].”).
157. South African judges are facing similar challenges to those faced by the
Ghanaian judges because it has only been in the post-apartheid period that they have been
authorized to apply customary law. See T. W. Bennett, Re-introducing African Customary
Law to the South African Legal System, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 5 (2009) (critiquing some of
the South African decisions applying customary law).
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time when even the Chiefs cannot give a good reason why a rule is in place, and if
this is so, people may not be willing to follow it. This would seem to be true, for
example, with customs permitting trespass and destruction of property.
Finally, the fact that Ghana has a robust common law system clearly will
have some impact on the invocation of customary law rights and remedies. While
some of the customary torts clearly fall outside of the common law rules, people
may choose to avail themselves of the common law causes of action when they
have a choice, particularly if the remedies are more generous in terms of damages.
Although all these factors may dissuade people from invoking customary
law, there are still many reasons for customary law to continue. The corporate
and group nature of the Ghanaian descent system, the communal aspect of
Ghanaian culture, the role of the family, and the role of customary law in
maintaining the structure of society are fully intact in Ghana and not likely to
change soon. Customary law is still more inclusive than the common law in its
vision of what constitutes a “wrong” and more generous with respect to remedies.
To the extent that the Chieftaincy institution and other traditional institutions
perform their duties properly, these cases will not need to be brought to courts.
The use of Chiefs as part of the dispute resolution process, along with community
tribunals where no legal representation is needed, makes customary torts an
accessible and practical way to solve problems. All of these factors suggest that
Ghanaians will continue to utilize their customary torts.
IV. OUR INDIVIDUAL PERSPECTIVES
A. Ghanaian Perspective
As a Ghanaian and a member of the Konkomba ethnic group, I grew up
in a typical rural village, Dagbanjado, in the Northern Region of Ghana, where
customary law was the only normative system that maintained and regulated
social life and relations. The principles that underlie customary tort law were
ingrained in me very young. I was taught not to undermine the name and dignity
of the family. I witnessed forms of social control, such as the public singing of
the name and offense of a person who stole something, that were very effective in
preventing departure from customary norms. Thus, my perspective on customary
tort law is colored not only by legal analysis but also by my life experience. I
firmly believe in the continued importance of customary law to Ghanaian society.
The law, whether embodied in statute or case law, sets a minimum rule of
conduct. The decorum, peace, and stability of every human society—developed
and underdeveloped—depends on the existence of certain norms, values, or shared
expectations, and indeed a collective conscience that go beyond the confines of
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codified law or judicial decisions.158 In other words, values, norms, and standards
beyond statute or common law are a functional prerequisite for an orderly,
predictable, and stable society. This is particularly important in a society such as
Ghana where the values and normative systems are ethnically diverse and this
diversity is cherished and upheld.
As our analysis above demonstrates, there are many types of conduct
which may injure members of the community or society either as individuals or as
a group for which there is no common law or statutory remedy. The relevance of
Ghanaian customary law then lies in the fact that it provides relief and remedies
where individuals or groups who feel injured in one way or the other would
otherwise have had no such relief or remedy. Further, its importance lies in the
fact that it emphasizes that which binds and holds people together, rather than
what pulls them apart. This is not surprising given the corporate nature of the
descent groups in Ghana.
In Nkrumah v. Manu,159 one of the now classic cases on the customary
tort of slander, Justice Taylor’s opinion expressed the view that customary law
had become irrelevant in modern civilization. He stated:
I must say though that it is about time the customary law of
slander took on a more enlightened garb and moved so to speak
with the demands of modern times. When village communities
were small and the written word was unknown to customary law
the only means of social and commercial intercourse was the
spoken word. It was therefore essential for the preservation of
the peace of those small communities that idle insults which
ridicule and may therefore ruin a person be discouraged by the
body politic. With the very drastic changes which modern
civilization has imposed on community and rural life throughout

158. As early as 1935, McCardie, J., observed the limitation of statute law and judicial
decisions in the case of marital life as follows:
I should like to add three things, in view of several questions raised in
the speeches or arguments of counsel. Firstly, it seems to be clear that
the position as between husbands and wives and third parties calls for
reconsideration by the law in view of the new status of married women.
Secondly, the rights of a married woman to form her independent
friendships and enjoy her own amusements can never be solved by the
law but must be determined by the standards of loyalty, of courtesy, and
of good sense; and, thirdly, that the comfort and happiness of married
life rests not on statutes or decisions but on matters that lie beyond and
above the realm of law.
Place v. Searle, [1932] 2 K.B. 497, 510.
159. [1971] 1 G.L.R. 176 (Ghana).
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the country it seems to me that the law has more serious
problems to tackle than silly vituperation.160
Agreeing with Justice Taylor, Professor Date-Bah observed that the more salutary
course is for the law to develop along lines aimed at promoting greater tolerance.
In his view, life in a democratic community demands a high degree of tolerance
and it is desirable on policy grounds that attempts are made to blunt the unduly
sensitive feeling of the average Ghanaian towards insults by denying him a civil
remedy for mere vituperation. Professor Date-Bah noted where the insult is such
as is likely to lead to a breach of the peace, the law may intervene through the
criminal law. But where the criminal law test is not satisfied, the law should not
grant damages to an insulted party merely to assuage his feelings.161
In my view, both Justice Taylor and Professor Date-Bah were wrong in
their rejection of the customary tort of slander. Justice Taylor’s reference to the
imposition of changes by modern civilization is problematic. He seemed to
suggest that the sensibilities of Ghanaians as to what amounts to intolerably
offensive conduct or comments as defined by the community should be discarded
as a result of changes imposed by modern civilization. What “civilization” was he
writing about and whose civilization is it? In any case, if those changes
“imposed” by modern civilization are indeed an imposition, why should

160. Id. at 181–82.
161. See Date-Bah, supra note 143. Professor Date-Bah later doubted his own
position. In a subsequent article, Date-Bah seemed to contradict himself when he said:
[T]he present writer believes that the law may be used in all its
branches as a legitimate instrument of social change. Where such
social change requires changes in community values, it is again thought
that the law is a legitimate instrument to employ. However, though
legitimate, it will not always be an efficacious instrument. The view is
probably least efficacious as an instrument of change where it is
seeking to overturn age-old community values. Where such values are
sought to be changed, other more directly educational institutions such
as the formal schools, the churches, the individual family units in
which young children are socialised, etc. may be more important agents
of change than a changed legal rule. A point that may therefore be
made in response to Taylor J.’s dictum is that refusing to provide a tort
remedy for insult will not necessarily make Ghanaians less sensitive to
insult. It may merely lead to insulted Ghanaians taking the law into
their own hands or at least speaking ill of the law for not giving just
redress to their felt grievances.
Date-Bah, supra note 40.
And he admitted at footnote 10 that: “The present writer wrote approvingly of Taylor
J.'s criticism in (1971) 3 R.G.L. 164, esp. at p. 167, but is now not so sure whether he ought
to have been so approving.” Id.
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Ghanaians give up their ways of life in the name of such so-called “modern
civilization?”
Further, although I agree with Professor Date-Bah that tolerance is an
admirable value in a society, the desire for tolerance does not and should not mean
that members of the community should discard and disregard legitimate claims as
defined by their communities that are, or should be, remediable. What is defined
as slanderous at customary law is defined not by the individual, but by the
community; the collective sense of what is wrong and unacceptable cannot be
discarded in the name of modernization. Professor Date-Bah’s willingness to
relinquish the realm of customary law to criminal law represents too narrow a
view of societal wrongs. What may offend the collective conscience may not
amount to a breach of peace, and if a breach of peace were to be used as the basis
for liability, many defamatory wrongs would go unredressed. If the people decide
to maintain their values and normative system in the face of modernization, those
values and normative system should be respected.
In my view, the people who practice the particular customary beliefs and
practices are the lawmakers, and their practices should be deferred to in most
instances. Those who can change or “amend” customary law are the very people
who practice the particular custom. Not even Parliament may intervene, unless
customary practices “dehumanise or are injurious to the physical and mental wellbeing”162 or the health of a person,163 in which case a judge may declare the
particular custom null and void. Absent apparent contradiction with the
constitutional provisions, a judge in Ghana has no basis for reducing customary
practices to a nullity. In a number of the cases cited above, the decisions of the
judges did not meet this yardstick. The judges tended to base their decisions on
what they perceived ought to be the law in the light of social change rather than
what the law is. They overlooked the important role customary law still plays as
the normative base binding together Ghanaian society in so many parts of the
country.
Notwithstanding my criticism of certain decisions, I recognize and
admire the questions these judges have asked about the place of customary tort
law in an evolving society. The structure of the Ghanaian legal system invites and
indeed requires judges who are fully versed in the common law tradition and in
customary law, and this is no small task for some. No doubt the debate will
continue, and I hope that Ghanaians will pursue it with full understanding of the
role of customary law generally and customary torts in particular in Ghanaian
society.

162. See GHANA CONST. art. 26(2).
163. See id. art. 39(2).
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B. American Perspective
My perspective on customary tort law in Ghana is that of an outsider;
therefore, I cannot suggest whether it should thrive or perish in the future.
Although I have no vested interest in Ghanaian customary tort law, I believe
Ghana’s experiences hold many useful lessons relevant both to the role of
customary law and to torts in particular. First, customary tort law allows us to
examine in a new context many of the issues that U.S. torts scholars think about
on a regular basis. One of these issues is how we conceive of injury for purposes
of defamation and other dignitary torts. The breadth of Ghanaian customary law
makes the distinctions between insults and defamation seem insignificant, blurring
the validity of the careful and arcane lines we tend to draw in the British and
American common law tradition. While our society is not organized in a manner
that allows words to undermine an entire clan, the Ghanaians’ willingness to
accept and redress this type of injury gives credibility to the claim that perhaps we
have understated the injuriousness of certain courses of conduct by excluding
them from the tort system.
The existence of a remedial alternative to courts, administered cheaply
and without great societal cost or legal representation, is also instructive. In
essence, the remedies of the justice system are always at hand, and a departure
from that model would seem to be a loss for the Ghanaians. In many torts
disputes, from defamation to medical malpractice, it has been observed that
sometimes all that is really desired is a simple remedy: an apology or a
clarification. The American system is woefully inadequate to provide those
remedies.
Turning to insights about customary law more generally, Ghana is
noteworthy in its commitment to the retention of its customary law and its
development of institutions that can monitor the course the law takes in the future.
There are inevitable tensions between modern concepts such as nondiscrimination on the basis of sex164 and strong gender roles in customary
practice.165 It will be a challenge for Ghanaian courts and institutions, such as the
164. Various international laws require that Ghana treat women as equals of men. See
Fenrich & Higgins, supra note 32, at 264–68. Ghana’s domestic law also makes this
commitment. See id. at 285–94.
165. Ghanaian customary law is not uniformly male-focused. Some ethnic groups,
such as the Akan, are matrilineal. See id. at 270. However, some scholars have argued that
customary laws relating to marriage and family rights confer asymmetrical rights and
obligations, with benefit tilting toward males. See id. at 274–82. Others argue that as legal
reforms affecting the status of women have taken place, the policy makers confront
pressure from certain, often elite, constituents, as well as from other countries, to adopt
changes that will modify the traditional gender roles. They often also face resistance to
these changes from the rural population that adheres to these ideas and structures. See
Gwendolyn Mikell, Culture, Law, and Social Policy: Changing the Economic Status of
Ghanaian Women, 17 YALE J. INT’L L. 225 (1992) (arguing that women in developing
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House of Chiefs, to continue to weave a legal tapestry that incorporates different
world views, but their capacity to do so may well determine whether these two
systems can continue to coexist in harmony.
Finally, customary law plays a more important role in the geo-political
landscape than many observers recognize. Westerners are prone to suggesting the
importance of exporting the “Rule of Law” (meaning common or civil law) to
other countries and are often unlikely to recognize that customary law is in place
and functioning. In Afghanistan, for example, once one ventures outside of
Kabul, customary law is used in tribal settings to resolve disputes.166 Countries
such as Ghana that have given thoughtful attention to the role of customary law
and its integration with other legal principles could be invaluable in providing
insights to other countries as they seek to attain peace and stability.167
V. CONCLUSION
Ghanaian customary tort law is a vibrant and living source of protection
against the injuries that Ghanaians consider most serious: individual harm, social
upheaval, chaos, and destruction of the family unit that anchors all of society. Just
as the common law changes through judicial accretions, at times reversing its
conception of what constitutes an injury or whether a remedy ought to be
awarded, Ghanaian customary law has the potential to change. Although
customary law is protected by the Constitution, laws and institutions of Ghana, the
people who adhere to the norms and values embodied by customary law can
change or reject it. They may in time do so, if they begin to see some practices as
contrary to their own interests. But until that time, the judges and legislators who
comprise Ghana’s legal establishment should respect customary practices. These
values and norms have sustained Ghana’s many ethnic groups through periods of
enormous social and political upheaval; the purposes they serve are multi-faceted
and important. Just as common law tort principles provide a snapshot of society’s
values, customary law principles reinforce the essence of Ghanaian diversity and
countries can best improve their economic status through the development of local cultural
organizations that do not come into conflict with cultural traditions).
166. See Afghanistan: In Search of Justice: Rural Afghans Resistant to Official
Judicial System (National Public Radio broadcast Dec. 17, 2008) (describing the authority
of jirgas, or tribal councils, despite efforts to rebuild the country’s judicial system with the
help
of
international
aid),
available
at
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=98331042.
167. George Ayittey suggests that the indigenous court system’s emphasis on
reconciliation and the promotion of social harmony to resolve disputes and conflicts while
seeking justice has worked so well that modern African societies ought to consider
establishing an “international” court using those principles. The history of strife between
groups within a country and between African countries surely makes this suggestion
worthy of serious consideration. See AYITTEY, supra note 34, at 68–69.
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ethnicity and the ethos of the multi-faceted groups that comprise the people of
Ghana.

